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CHANGING THE "FOURTH CHANNELS":
TAIWAN TUNES IN
TO A NEW CABLE TELEVISION LAW
Sophia R. Byrd
Abstract: Threatened with potentially massive trade sanctions by the United
States, Taiwan enacted the Cable Television Law in 1993 to regulate the so-called
"Fourth Channels," hundreds of private cable operations that transmitted programming
pirated from the United States and other sources. This Comment identifies the roots of
the Fourth Channels and examines the U.S. and Taiwanese forces that gave rise to the
cable law. The Comment analyzes major provisions of the law and explores the law's
effects on both U.S. and Taiwanese interests.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1980s, at the end of four decades of martial law, Taiwan's
Legislators and
government languished in a leadership vacuum.
policymakers struggling to adapt to newly democratized procedures were
unable to keep up with the rapid pace of technology and the increasing
demands of international commerce. In a dizzying context of greater
societal freedoms and evolving politics, unregulated cable television-a
popular and lucrative enterprise-grew unchecked. Among other problems,
a lack of cable regulation contributed to widespread violation of motionpicture copyrights. But under pressure from the United States to curb this
rampant piracy, Taiwan enacted the Cable Television Law I in 1993 as part
of an effort to rein in copyright violators.
This Comment reviews the forces, American and Taiwanese, which
ultimately prompted the enactment of cable legislation that had languished
for more than a decade, and examines the subsequent impact of the law on
U.S. and Taiwanese interests. Specifically, Part II outlines the political
setting in which regulation was finally promulgated, and examines major
provisions of the cable law and its early implementation. Part III analyzes
the law's demonstrated and potential effects on U.S. trade interests,
including declining video piracy and new trade barriers. Part III also
discusses the law's potential to restrict free expression in Taiwan, as well as
Cable Television Law (July 16, 1993) (ROC) (Chinese-language law and English
translation on
file with the author) [hereinafter Taiwan Cable Television Law].
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the measure's contributions toward achieving the Republic of China's
("ROC") technology goals.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

History of Cable Television in Taiwan

When the ROC government withdrew to the island of Taiwan in 1949
following the communist takeover of mainland China, the ruling
Kuomintang ("KMT" Nationalist Party) strictly enforced communications
restrictions to ensure that the media complied with anti-communist policies
and KMT nation-building goals. 2 The KMT insisted that until it was
restored to rule on the mainland it would enforce "Three Nos": no contact,
no negotiation, and no compromise with the mainland.
In the past forty years, however, the KMT's claim to mainland rule
has deteriorated .
Since martial law was lifted in 1987, the KMT has
abolished many longtime communications restrictions, including a ban on
new publications and electronic media, and has ceased to enforce policies
against reporting favorably about mainland China or calling for Taiwan's
independence from the mainland. Along with this political evolution came
veritable revolutions in economics and technology, and these three forces
spurred major growth in news and entertainment media. 6
Print media achieved greater liberty than electronic media, however.7
The island's three broadcast television stations remain heavily influenced
by the KMT and are substantially owned by the party, the military and the
provincial government of Taiwan-all politically intertwined entities. Not
surprisingly, these broadcast stations present a homogenous, pro-KMT view

2
Bonnie Peng, The Regulation of New Media in Taiwan, 4 ASIAN J. COMM. 97, 98 (1994); see also
JOHN VANDEN HEUVEL & EVERETTE E. DENNIS, THE UNFOLDING LOTUS: EAST ASIA'S CHANGING MEDIA,
A REPORT OF THE FREEDOM FORUM MEDIA STUDIES CENTER AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF
NEW YORK 41 (1993).
3
VANDEN HEUVEL & DENNIS, supra note 2, at 41.

4
5
6
7
8

(1994).

VANDEN HEUVEL & DENNIS, supra note 2, at 4 1.
VANDEN HEUVEL & DENNIS, supra note 2, at 44.
Peng, supranote 2, at 98, 100.
Peng, supranote 2, at
98, 100.
Glen Lewis et al., Television Globalization in Taiwan
and Australia, 21 MEDIA ASIA 183, 184
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of news. 9 As for entertainment, one correspondent has described the
shows and saccharine melodramas [that
stations' fare as "cheap variety
0
boredom."'
the
don't] relieve
It was boredom with the government-owned stations, in large part,
that led to the rise in the 1970s of what quickly became the most dynamic
players on the Taiwan media scene: "Fourth Channels," so named because
these illicit cable television entrepreneurs presented news and entertainment
alternatives to the three government broadcasters.l1

Until July 1993, only about 120 cable stations were legal in Taiwan,
authorized merely as "community television" delivery systems to relay
signals from the government broadcast stations to outlying communities
with poor reception.' 2 The existing Broadcasting and Television Law did
of additional, nongovernment programming. 13

not allow cable transmission
Nevertheless, by the early 1990s there were an estimated 300 to 60014 illegal
Fourth Channel stations in Taiwan providing about fifty channels via

videotape and, as the technology became more available, via satellite

signals from Japan, Hong Kong and the United States. 15 At their height, the
larger operations served about 200,000 customers each, while the smaller

enterprises served just a few thousand, with about thirty percent of the
cable service.16
island's approximately four million households receiving
One reporter described the urban skyline as web-like, criss-crossed with
9

VANDEN HEUVEL & DENNIS. supranote 2, at 51.
10 Julian Baum, Untangling the Wires, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 27, 1993, at 74, available
in
WESTLAW, FEER Database.
Id; see also VANDEN HEUVEL & DENNIS, supra note 2, at 51.
12 Jeremy Mark, Taiwan Seeks to Legalize Cable-TV Firms, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 14, 1992, at 1;
Peng, supra note 2, at 102.
see also
13 Peng,
supra note 2, at 102.

quant

14 The numbers vary from source to source for no discemable reason other than the difficulty of
ing an unregulated, illegal industry for which there are no "official" numbers.

Taiwan's Cable Industry, ASIAN CENTURY BUS. RPTS., Feb. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
ACBR Database; see also GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1995, 355
(1995). Fourth Channels typically invested in "minimal equipment-a satellite dish, a few VCRs,
videortaps and cable-worth at most US$500,000." Id
Philip Liu, Taiwan: Cable TV Law-A Milestone for the Island's Mass Media, BUS. TAIWAN,
Aug. 2, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File. See also Baum, supra note
10 (some analysts predict that by 1996, 60% of households will subscribe to cable-the subscriber level in
the United States and other mature cable markets); Taiwan's Cable Industry, supra note 15 (the cable
industry believes it can attract three million more households, which would give Taiwan the highest cable
density in Asia).
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"[jury-rigged] cables 17
[hanging] from street lights and telephone poles in
almost every district"'

Service costs averaged about US$65 for hookup plus US$6-$25 per
month,' s not prohibitive for the Taiwanese, who earn an average of
US$1,000 per month. 19 For their money, subscribers received a feast of
programs, most of which were pirated, including CNN International,
Chinese-language
films, 20 karaoke, stockmarket quotes, 21 hard-core
orn
22
pornography, and newly released U.S. movies-even as they were still

playing in Taipei theaters. 23 Entertainment wasn't the only attraction of the

Fourth Channels, however. About 200,000 households in 1993 subscribed
to "Democracy Television," a group of about fifty cable stations that

specialized in political speeches and current-affairs programs favorable to
the political opposition.
Despite a vigorous anti-cable campaign, the ROC government could
not stamp out the Fourth Channels. 25 In 1991, in its most concentrated
crackdown, the government ripped out 370,000 kilograms (814,000 pounds)

of transmission lines in four months-to no avail..26

Cable operators

restored their connections as fast as the police could cut them, 27 and

operators quickly learned that penalties would be minimal.

The self-

described "father" of illicit cable recounted numerous arrests but only brief
'7 Baum,
supra note 10.
18 Lewis etal.,
supra note 8; see also Alan Shih, Spoiling the
Party, CABLE & SATELLITE EUR., Nov.
1992, at 43.
19 Kirby Chien, Taiwan's GDP Growth Rate Slows
Amid Stagnant Property Market, ASIAN WALL
ST. J., Aug. 21, 1995, at 3. See also Taiwan Sees Stable GDP Growth, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1995,
at 9 (citing a leading Taiwanese official's estimate that annual per capita income will be $20,000 within
five years); Taiwan Struggles With Change, ASIA MARKET PAC., Mar. I, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
PTS Database. Telephone survey regarding ownership of large-ticket items indicates the depth of
Taiwan's middle class. Id. For example, by 1992 virtually every household owned a color television set,
68% owned VCRs, 99% owned regrigerators, 90% owned washing machines, 95% owned telephones, 12%
ownedjpersonal computers and 56% had air conditioning, up from just 5% in 1977. Id.
Baum, supra note
10.
21 Mark,
supra note 12.
22 Liu,
supra note 16.
23
Mark, supra note 12.
24
Mark, supra note 12.
25
Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 184.
26
Mark, supra note 12.

27

Julian Baum, Broadcasting Buccaneer, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 7, 1993, at 78, available in
WESTLAW, FEER Database.

JULY 1996

CABLE TELEVISION LA WIN TAIWAN

detentions and small fines during his twenty-three years as a "broadcast
buccaneer." 28 Another longtime illegal operator described the Fourth
Channels as embodying a "gentlemen's agreement" between the stations
29
that "we keep to our areas and don't compete with neighboring systems."
But officials viewed the illegal operators as more akin to gangsters than
30
gentlemen, and the cable systems as not just underground but underworld.
ROC officials blamed continuing enforcement failures on the absence
of laws to specifically address illegal cable operators, though some
observers maintained that the authorities simply lacked the will to enforce
existing statutes and crack down on a thriving industry that had gained
widespread popular support.31 Indeed, it requires little imagination to
believe that ROC administrators subscribed to and enjoyed the variety of
cable programming every bit as much as the general public, and therefore
hesitated to shut down the industry. But when the U.S. government began
threatening trade sanctions in retaliation for copyright infringement by the
Fourth Channels, the ROC government
found its will-and a way-to rein
32
in the maverick cable operators.
B.

MajorProvisionsof the Cable Television Act

In attempting to come to terms with the Fourth Channels-which the
ROC government realized it could not simply eradicate-lawmakers first
33
moved to bring the illicit operators under state regulation in the 1980s.
Legalization and regulation were recommended to the government by a
university study it commissioned in 1985, and legislation was first drafted
in 1989. 34 But not until July 1993, on the chaotic last day of the Legislative
35
Yuan, did legislators finally enact the controversial Cable Television Law.
28 Id.
29

Baum, supra note 10.
30
Mark, supra note 12.
3'
Mark, supra note 12.
32
Mark, supra note 12.
33 Lewis
et al., supra note 8, at 185.
34
Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 185.
35 Taiwan Cable Television Law (July 16, 1993) (ROC).

The Legislative Yuan is one of five
branches of national government and is the highest legislative organ of the state, constituted of popularly
elected representatives who serve three-year terms. Among other powers, the Legislative Yuan exercises
general lawmaking powers on behalf of the citizens. GOV'T INFO. OFFICE, REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK
1994, 104, 109 (1994).
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The landmark law ended forty-four years of virtual government monopoly
in legal electronic media, and, ironically, initiated strict government control
over a heretofore unrecognized and unregulated medium.
The government had delayed legalization of private cable TV mainly
out of political considerations and uncertainty about the potential impacts of
regulation. 37 The chairman of the Telecommunications Department of the
World College of Journalism and Communications told the Taipei Satellite
and Cable Convention in 1992 that the government was primarily concerned
about its ability to control the medium once it was legally recognized.38
Under the law as it was adopted, however, the ROC government clearly has
far more substantive and procedural control over authorized cable stations
than it had over the freewheeling Fourth Channels.
The law does not provide for a single, central regulatory agency
similar to the U.S. Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"); 39 rather
the designated regulatory authorities are the Government Information Office
("GIO") in the central government, the Department of Information in the
provinces, and the local Department of Information in the counties and
cities.
However, the Taiwan law does provide for a centralized Review
Committee, which one commentator describes as having the potential to act
as an FCC-like agency. 41 The Committee has the authority to review the
revocation of permits for cable systems, the issuance or renewal of licenses
for overators, and other items regulated by the law or requested by the
GIO.
During debate on the measure, many legislators expressed concerns
that the Committee not be overrepresented by government officials.4 3
36 Julian Baum, We Interrupt This Broadcast: Taiwan Moves
to Rein in Cable-TV Operators, FAR E.
ECON. REV., July 29, 1993, at 61, available in WESTLAW, FEER Database.
37 Lewis et al., supra note
8, at 185.
38 Alan Shih, Spoiling the Party, CABLE & SATELLITE EUR.,
Nov. 1992, at 42.
39 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) [hereinafter U.S. Cable Communications Act].
40 Taiwan Cable Television
Law, art. 3.
41 Peng, supra note
2, at 104.
42 Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 8; cf U.S.
Cable Communications Act (FCC is an independent
federal agency charged with broad authority to license, adopt administrative rules and regulations, conduct

administrative hearings, and assess fees and penalties in accordance with federal law. The Commission
delegates some authority to local franchising authorities, usually municipal governments, to award cable
franchises within its jurisdiction.).
43 Peng, supra note 2, at 104.
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Consequently, the law calls for thirteen to fifteen part-time Committee
members, of which eleven to thirteen shall be scholars or communications
experts, one shall represent the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, and one shall represent the GIO.44 No more than half the
members may be from the same political party, and while serving on the
Committee for a maximum of two three-year terms they are not allowed to
Despite these safeguards, one
participate in any party activities.45
Taiwanese scholar is concerned about the Committee's ability to remain
independent of government, parties and business. 46 Indeed,
47 corruption is a

widespread problem at all levels of government in Taiwan.
Other major elements of Taiwan's Cable Television Law include:

0 No cross-media ownership. Existing publications, broadcasters
and directors, supervisors and managers of these media are prohibited from
serving in any capacity at a cable TV station. 48 The three government
broadcast stations, citing experience in electronic media and a desire to
diversify, had wanted to enter the legal cable industry,' 9 yet the government,
to allow cross-ownership out
despite its affiliation with the stations, refused
50
of concern for unfair economic competition.

44

Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 9; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (codified
in 47 U.S.C. §
154) (The FCC is composed of five commissioners appointed by the president with advice and consent of
the Senate. Members shall not have any financial interest in any individual, business or entity engaged in
communications industry. Unlike the Taiwan Review Committee, FCC positions are not allocated to
particular fields, e.g., academia and government.).
45 Taiwan
Cable Television Law, arts. 9-10; cf U.S. Cable Communications
Act (codified in 47
U.S.C. § 154) (FCC commissioners are appointed to five-year terms. The maximum number who may be
members of the same political party is equal to the least number that constitutes a majority of the full
membership of the Commission. Commissioners shall not participate in any profession or business or be
employed while serving on the Commission.).
otherwise
46 Peng,
supranote 2, at 105.
47 Jeremy
Mark, Taiwan Reformers Warn KMT: Change or Wither, ASiAN WALL
ST. J., Aug. 12,
1993, at 1.
48
Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 20; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (codified in 47 U.S.C.
§ 533) (No one may be a cable operator who directly or through one or more affiliates owns or controls a
broadcast television station that serves any portion of the community served by the operator's cable
system. A state or local franchising authority may hold any ownership interest in any cable system;
however, a state or local franchising authority may not prohibit the ownership or control of a cable system
by a person who has ownership or other interests in other mass media.).
Peng, supranote 2,
at 105.
50 Peng, supra note 2, at 105.
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* No foreign investment. Despite pressure from U.S. officials and
businesses, foreign individuals or entities may not invest in a Taiwanese
cable company, the structure
of which is limited to a corporation with
51

widely distributed shares.
0 Limited ownership. Individuals are not allowed to own more than
ten percent of a company's stock, and families (blood relatives, spouses 52and
relatives by marriage) are not allowed to own more than twenty percent.
•
Programming. Twenty percent of programming must be
domestically produced, 53 and ten percent of transmission time is reserved

for public service and educational programs. 54 So-called "adult" programs
are limited to encoded channels or post-midnight hours.55 Programs shall
not "adversely affect good social customs," 56 and the GIO may, "if it deems
necessary," request and review a cable program and related materials within

fifteen days of transmission of the program. 57 This provision, which puts
cable operators in the position of carefully policing their own content, gives
the GIO substantial censorship powers without the political fallout and
bureaucracy that would be associated with pre-transmission review and

prior restraint of programs.

51 Taiwan Cable
Television Law, art. 20; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (no ban on
foreign
investment).
52 Taiwan Cable Television
Law, art. 20; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (no limitations on
individual
or
family
ownership).
53 Taiwan Cable Television
Law, art. 35; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (no domestic
programming quotas).
Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 23; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act
(codified in 47 U.S.C.
§ 531) (Local franchising authorities may require cable operator to designate channels for public,
educational,
or governmental use.).
55 Taiwan
Cable Television Law, art. 35; cf U.S. Cable Communications
Act (codified in 47 U.S.C.
§ 544(2)(A)) (Constitutionally protected programs are unrestricted by statute except that, upon the request
of a subscriber, a cable operator must provide a device by which the subscriber can block personally
objectionable
programming.).
56 Taiwan
Cable Television Law, art. 35; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act
(codified in 47 U.S.C.
§ 559) (The only content regulation in the U.S. law provides that programs found by a court to be obscene
or otherwise not protected by the Constitution may be terminated, and the cable operator responsible for
transmitting such programs may be fined up to $10,000 and imprisoned up to two years.).
57 Taiwan Cable
Television Law, art. 37; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (codified
in 47 U.S.C.
§§ 533, 544) (No federal agency, state, or local franchising authority may prohibit or require certain cable
programming unless the programming is not protected by the U.S. Constitution.).
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0 Advertising standards. Total advertising time is limited to no more
than one-tenth the length of the proximate program.58 Advertising shall be
clearly distinguishable from programs,5 9 though separate all-ad channels
may be established. 6 0 As with programs, the GIO may review ad content
within fifteen days of transmission.f
* Taxes. Two percent of gross revenues are to be paid to the
government to fund public cultural projects, and an additional
one percent is
62
to be paid to the government to fund public television.
* Contracts. Subscription fees are subject to annual government
approval,63 contracts between stations and customers are to be in writing,64 .
and operator licenses are to be granted for nine years.65

Among the most controversial issues that arose in the legislative
debate on the measure were how many cable districts would be established
and how many operators would be licensed in each district. 66 Although a
panel of experts recommended just one operator per district (similar to
arrangements in most countries, including the United States), a majority of
lawmakers opposed exclusive franchises, citing fears of a monopoly on
political resources. 67 Thus the Legislative Yuan passed a law that

58 Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 38; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (no regulation of ad
time).59
Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 41; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (no regulation of
ad
content).
6 Taiwan Cable Television Law,
art. 39.
61 Id. art. 41; cf U.S. Cable
Communications Act (as with programming, there is no government
review.
6 Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 44; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (codified
in 47 U.S.C.

§ 542. Cable operators may be required under the terms of any franchise to pay annual franchise fees of
not more than 5 % of the operator's gross revenues.).
63

Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 43; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (codified in 47 U.S.C.

§ 543) (If the FCC finds that a cable system is subject to effective competition, the system's subscriber
rates are not subject to regulation by the FCC, state or local franchising authority.).

64 Taiwan
Cable Television Law, art.
46.
65 Id., art. 29.
66
Peng, supra note 2, at 105; cf U.S. Cable Communications Act (codified
in 47 U.S.C. § 541)
(Local franchising authorities, usually municipal governments, may award at least one cable franchise
within the jurisdiction. Most franchising authorities, however, award only one franchise within the
jurisdiction.).
67 Peng, supra note 2, at 10; see also Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 185.
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authorizes up to five operators in each of fifty-two districts,
6 an "overbuilt"
8
untenable.
prove
will
believe
experts
many
that
framework
Some officials also are concerned about the impact of so many
stations on the quality of service. 69 The Executive Yuan, for instance, has
said that multiple stations per district will lead to costly overlapping
investment in hardware, 70 a legitimate concern given Taiwan's ambitious
national goals for upgrading communications tecnology. 71 The Executive
Yuan had supported limiting each district to one operator to assure good
returns on investments so operators would be able to afford the highest
quality hardware and programming.72 Exclusive franchises would have
assured each cable operator of 80,000 potential customers; the current law
will assure an average of only 16,000.73
But market forces probably will accomplish what political forces
could not. Realistically, just one or two stations are likely td survive in each
district following an early period of intense competition.7 4 Indeed, many
Fourth Channel operators and some well-financed newcomers began
working on mergers even before the law was passed. 5
C.

Early Implementation of the Cable Television Law

In the face of its myriad failed attempts to shut down the Fourth
Channels, and the time needed to set up legal franchises, the ROC
government's strategy under the new cable law was to establish temporary
legalization-an amnesty period-for the Fourth Channel operators. 76 In

68 Lewis et al., supra note 8, at 185; see also Taiwan Cable Television Law, art.
27 (authorizing no
more than five systems per district, and authorizing the GIO to establish districts based on factors including

population distribution and geographic environment).
69

Liu, supra note 16.
70
Liu, supranote 16.
71

Peng, supra note 2, at 102.
72
Liu, supranote 16.
Liu, supra note 16.
74
76 Liu, supra note 16.
75
Liu, supra note 16.
76
Mark, supra note 12.
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November 1993, 7 the
GIO implemented interim provisions to legalize the
7
Fourth Channels.

The GIO required that existing illegal operators and other
entrepreneurs wishing to set up legal cable stations apply for a overnment
license or face heavy fines and an enforcement crackdown. 8 By the
November 1, 1994 deadline, only about 200 operators had applied.7 9
Operators are required to register their businesses and subscriber numbers
with the local government information department. 80 If a cable operator is
found to be unregistered or otherwise in violation of the regulations, such as
by transmitting pirated programming, it is to be shut down.8 ' The GIO
charged local government information departments and police stations with
strictly monitoring cable transmissions and apprehending operators not in
compliance with the new regulations. 82 Under the cable TV law, violators
are to lose their licenses, have their businesses closed and equipment
confiscated, and be fined up to US$56,000. 83 To date, there have been no
published reports of substantial violations or sanctions.
Most Fourth Channel operators support the interim regulation. 84 The
plan at least gives them an opportunity to operate legally and compete in a
potentially lucrative market, even if that means merging with competitors in
order to raise the approximately US$7 million that most operators must
invest to upgrade their facilities in accord with the law's strict engineering
standards.

77

Taiwan: Gov't Gives Cable TV Stations Chance to Become Legal, CHINA ECON. NEWS
SERV.,
Nov. 10, 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File [hereinafter Chance to
Become Legal].
78 Id (reports 197
applications received); see also William Zarit, Taiwan Mapping
Out Plans to
Build the Superhighway to Its Information Future, E. ASIAN EXEC. RPrs., Jan. 15, 1995, at 18 (reports 204
applications received).
79 Cable-TV
Deluge in Taiwan, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 3, 1994, at A15.

80

Chance to Become Legal, supra note 77.
82 Chance to Become Legal, supra note 77.

82Chance to Become Legal supra note 77.
83 Taiwan's
Cable Industry, supra note 15.
84 Chance

to Become Legal, supra note 77; see also Taiwan's Cable Industry, supra
note 15; THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1995, supra note 15.
85 Taiwan'"s Cable Industry, supra note 15.
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D.

US. Pressuresto Regulate Cable Television in Taiwan

While the ROC government had studied plans to legalize and regulate
cable television from almost the earliest days of the Fourth Channels,8 6 it
did not proceed with legislation until the proliferation of cable piracy
sparked threats from foreign copyright owners.8 7 In April, 1993, the Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") targeted Taiwan as a major
violator of intellectual property rights, including broadcast and motion88
picture copyrights.
The USTR, under unilateral authority of the "Special 301" provision
89
of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act ("Trade Act") of 1988,
classified Taiwan as a "priority watch" country that failed to protect U.S.
intellectual property ("IP") rights.
Nations on the priority watch list are
considered less egre ious violators of IP rights than those listed as "priority
foreign countries." 9f Nevertheless, the USTR threatened Taiwan with
substantial -trade sanctions if it did not accelerate efforts to curb rampant
patent, trademark and copyright violations. 92 Among the USTR's prime
concerns were widespread piracy and copyright infringement by the Fourth
94
Channels. 93 The International Intellectual Property Alliance ("IIPA")
estimated that in 1992 alone U.S. trade losses due to copyright violation in
Taiwan were US$669 million. 95 In 1993, USTR again named Taiwan to the
priority watch list and required it to complete an "immediate action plan" by
96
the end of July or face sanctions.

86
Shih, supra note 38, at 43.
87Shih, supra note 38, at 43.
88 Mark,
supra note 12.
89 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 301; 102 Stat. 1164

(1988%,(codified in 19 U.S.C. § 2411) [hereinafter U.S. Trade Act].
USTR Fact Sheet on Special 301, Apr. 30, 1993, reprinted in 10 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 761
(May5, 1993), available in WESTLAW, BNA-ITR Database [hereinafter Special 301 Fact Sheet].

Id.
92

93

Id
ld

94

IIPA is a trade association/lobbying organization in Washington, D.C.
95 Laurence Zuckerman et al., Counterfeiting Crackdown: US.
Trade
Governments, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1993, at 1.
96 Special 301 Fact Sheet, supra note 90.

Deadline Hangs Over
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The Trade Act's Special 301 sanctions may include withdrawing
previously negotiated trade concessions and increasing import duties and/or
restrictions. 97 The sanctions are not limited to industries involved in
violating IP rights, but. may be directed at any industry in the infringing
nation.
For Taiwan, which has annual exports in excess of US$80
billion99 and a US$9.6 billion trade surplus with the00 United States, such
sanctions could have meant multibillion-dollar losses.
Under this threat, which the Clinton administration indicated it was
fully prepared to carry out, KMT leadership pushed for passage of the long0 In a
pending legislation to regulate cable television. !1
rush to meet the U.S.
imposed deadline before the end of the Legislative Yuan session, the KMT
rammed through, without debate; a version of the cable bill that included
controversial provisions which had been previously deleted. 1°2 One
provision allowed investment in cable by0 3Taiwan's political parties while
another banned direct foreign investment.
At least one observer linked the heavyhanded U.S. threats with the
lawmakers' decision to ban foreign ownership. "[All] foreigners have been
a kind of victim in reaction to the American pressure," said legislative
consultant James P.C. Liu. 10 4 "Legislators basically said, 'You (the U.S.)
put a time limit on the bill and we'll stick a knife in your back. '""'0 Taiwan
trade officials, however, justified the provision on the grounds that other
nations, including Finland, the Philippines and Venezuela, also prohibit
foreign ownership of domestic industries. 0 6 Despite the U.S. government's
general satisfaction with Taiwan's cable law and efforts to regulate the
97
U.S. Trade Act, supranote 89.
98
U.S. Trade Act, supra note 89"
99 THE

REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1995, supranote 15,
at 200.
100 United States Trade Representative, 1995 National Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers 289 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Trade Estimate Report].
101

Mark, supranote
12.
Baum, supra note 10; see also Jeremy Mark, Taiwan
Forces Passage of Bill on Cable TV,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 16, 1993, at 1.
103 Legislature Sees Usual Brouhaha Over Cable TV
Law, CHINA ECON. NEWS SERV., July 17,
102

1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File [hereinafter Brouhaha].
104

105

Mark, supra note 102.

Mark, supra note 102.

106 Foreign Firms Still BarredFrom Cable TV Operations
Here, China Econ. News Serv., Jan. 15,
1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File.
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Fourth Channels, it continues to pressure Taiwan to eliminate the foreign10 7
investment ban, which it sees as tantamount to an illegal trade barrier.
E.

Taiwan's InternalReasonsfor Enactinga Cable TV Law

In addition to appeasing the United States and maintaining a valuable
trade relationship, Taiwan had other, internal, reasons for enacting a cable
law. The ROC government long believed that state-of-the-art cable
technology would help realize several domestic goals. Indeed, officials first
explored the establishment of a legal cable TV system more than ten years
ago because the martial law government believed widespread cable
18
transmissions would further industrial and communications goals. 0
A government-sanctioned cable system was expected to reduce the
number of rural areas underserved by government stations, provide more
channels to match the development of integrated services digital networks,
as well as eliminate the regulatory problem of unregistered Fourth
Channels. 109 Accordingly, the GIO assembled a group of scholars in law,
economics and mass communications to draft a cable law in 1989.11 More
recently, the ROC government outlined official goals for economic
development in the next century that include plans to establish Taiwan as a
"regional operations center," one as, ect of which would encompass
Chinese-language television and film. 11 The 1993 cable law, with its
engineering standards and domestic programming quota, was designed in
part to be a key step toward that goal.
In addition to expecting that a cable law would boost the private
market economy through production of programming, hardware and
software, the government saw the measure as an opportunity to enhance its
taxing power and collect substantial public revenues." 3 And although
107 Osman Tseng, Warner Uses Back Channels to Enter
Local Cable TV Market, Bus. TAIWAN,
Mar. 20, 1995, availablein NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File.
108
Peng, supra note 2, at 102.
109
Peng, supra note 2, at 103.
110
Peng, supra note 2, at 103.
III

Economic Policy: Gov't Maintaining "Regional
Operations Centre" Plan, Economist
Intellipgence Unit Country Rep., May 15, 1995 [hereinafter Regional OperationsCentre Plan].

Id

113

1993, at 8.

Sally D. Goll, Foreign Cable TV Firms Target Taiwan Market,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., July 23,
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censorship was not a publicized goal for passage of the cable law, the
measure clearly increases the potential for strict state control over cable
programs and advertising 14 -a potential the KMT has not renounced.
III.

ANALYSIS

A.

Impact of Taiwan's Cable Law on US. Interests

Enactment and implementation of Taiwan's cable law has been a
mixed blessing for U.S. government and industries. On one hand, the
USTR got what it demanded: a statute that provides a substantially stronger
legal basis to prosecute cable oPerators who distribute copyrighted
programming without authorization. 115 On the other hand, the USTR also
got trade barriers it hadn't bargained for: a ban on foreign investment in

Taiwan cable systems and a requirement that one-fifth of programming be
domestically produced. 116
1.

Video PiracyDeclines

According to the IIPA in its last two annual reports to the USTR,
Taiwan has made strong efforts and considerable progress in reducing
piracy since the cable and copyright laws were enacted.
Total estimated
U.S. losses to IP piracy in Taiwan were US$145 million in 1995, down from
US$189 million in 1994 and US$669 million in 1992.118 Most of these
gains are credited to the ROC government's adoption of a broad copyright
law in 1992 that brought Taiwan into compliance with a 1989 Bilateral
Copyright Agreement. 119 However, the cable law is primarily responsible
for Taiwan's stepped-up efforts to curb motion picture piracy, which
114
115
116
117

Taiwan Cable Television Law, arts.
37, 41.
1995 Trade Estimate Report, supra note 100,
at 293.
Tseng, supra note
107..

International Intellectual Property Alliance, 1996 Special 301 Recommendations
and Estimated
Trade Losses Due to Piracy [hereinafter 1996 IIPA Special 301 Submission]; International Intellectual
Property Alliance, 1995 Special 301 Recommendations and Estimated Trade Losses Due to Piracy
[hereinafter 1995 IIPA Special 301 Submission].
118 1996 IIPA Special 301 Submission, supra note 117, at 210; 1995 IIPA Special 301 Submission,
supra note 117, at 147.

19 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 1994 Special 301 Recommendations and Estimated

Trade Losses Due to Piracy 102 [hereinafter 1994 IIPA Special 301 Submission].
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brought U.S.losses down from US$26 million in 1993120 to US$21 million
in 1994.121
While enforcement against illicit cable operators was inadequate in
1993, it improved and was sustained at the improved level in 1994 and
1995, according to the IIPA. 122 Some cable operators still illegally transmit
copyrighted U.S. programming, but the video piracy rate has declined to
about ten percent of Taiwan's cable programming. 123 Continued close
monitoring of Taiwan is warranted, however, because legal loopholes and
intense competition among cable operators could undercut the law's longterm effectiveness.
a.

Loopholes:andshortfalls in the law

While the U.S. government appears satisfied with current
enforcement efforts, shortfalls in Taiwan's cable and copyright laws still
contribute to substantial video piracy. One loophole, for instance, allows
unauthorized redistribution of satellite signals. 124 In 1993, the Judicial
Yuan determined that retransmitting satellite signals over cable systems

without paying carriage fees did not violate copyrights. 125 The ruling was
subsequently partially reversed to apply only to unencrypted signals. 2 6 In
contrast, the IIPA and the USTR maintain that Taiwan's copyright law and
the Bilateral Copyright Agreement prohibit unauthorized interception of
120

Id. at 104.
1995 IIPA Special 301 Submission, supra note
117. The IIPA's 1996 report actually estimates
an increase in U.S. trade losses to motion picture piracy in 1995 to US$29 million. 1996 IIPA Special
301
Submission, supra note 117, at 215. However, the IIPA finds that criminal enforcement is "consistent
and
sustained," and video piracy by cable operators has decreased significantly. 1996 IIPA Special
301
Submission, supra. The IIPA attributes the increased trade loss in 1995 to unauthorized importation
of
laser discs that are smuggled into the country and sold by retailers, and to "unauthorized exploitation"
of
older motion pictures that are not subject to retroactive copyright protections. 1996 IIPA Special
301
Submission, supra. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
122 1996 IIPA Special 301 Submission,
supra note 117; 1995 IIPA Special 301 Submission,
supra
note 117.
123 1995 IIPA Special 301 Submission, supra
note 117, at 149. The IIPA's 1996 report does
not
estimate a piracy rate; it merely states that video piracy "has dropped to a very low level." 1996
IIPA
Special 301 Submission, supranote 117, at 215.
124 Taiwan Cable Industry in Legal Quagmire,
SCREEN DIG., Nov. 1993, at 242 [hereinafter
Legal
Quagmire].
121

125Id

Id
161994 IIPA Special 301 Submission, supra note !119, at 103.
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both encrypted and unencrypted signals. 127 Practically speaking, however,
initial concerns that this rulin. would frighten off international networks
appear to have been misplaced.
Another loophole provides cable operators with not only an
opportunity but also an incentive to violate some U.S. copyrights. This
incentive arises because Taiwan does not protect copyrights on pre-1965
129
motion pictures, which are popular with cable stations and video stores.
Given the highly competitive nature of the newly legalized cable

industry, cash-strapped fledgling operators may choose to transmit
substantially more pre-1965 programming precisely because they can use it
for free without honoring copyrights and without risking sanctions for
piracy. Such activities, which perhaps benefit startup cable operators, harm
holders of both pre- and post-1965 copyrights.

Holders of post-1965

copyrights, while protected by law, may lose a substantial amount of
business to pre-1965 films, which are not protected and thus are more costeffective for cable operators.' 30 In fairness to holders of both pre- and post-

1965 copyrights, the USTR should continue to pressure the ROC
government to close this loophole and enact adequate retroactive copyright

protection.
A shortfall in the cable TV statute that could undercut efforts to shut
down piracy arises from the law's authorization of an "overbuilt" cable
system; that is, one allowing more stations in each district than the potential
subscriber base can realistically support. 13 1 It seems clear to most observers
that eventually only one or two stations will serve each district, but in the
127

1994 IIPA Special 301 Submission, supra note 119,
at 103.
128 See Walt Disney Co. to Launch Pay-TV Channel Here
Next March, CHINA ECON. NEWS SERV.,
Nov. 29, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File; A Taiwan STAR Is Born,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 24, 1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File
(Hong Kong's STAR-TV is carried by cable operators in Taiwan as is Hong Kong's TVBS Superchannel
and the American movie channel Home Box Office (HBO).); THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA YEARBOOK 1995,
supra note 15, at 325 (Foreign satellite transmissions carried by cable include NHK from Japan, CBS,
MTV and ESPN from the United States.); NBC's Asia Channels Gain Access toTaiwan Cable Systems,
MEDIA DAILY, Aug. 9, 1995, available in WESTLAW, PTS-NEWS Database.
129 1995
Trade Estimate Report, supra note 100,
at 294.
130 This
argument may be purely academic and have little practical application,
however. Professor
Paul Liu, Ph.D., of the University of Washington School of Law, spent several months in Taiwan in 1995
and reports that he saw very few pre-1965 films. He attributes the lack of older, English-language
programming to viewers' tastes, i.e., the older generation is more interested in locally produced Chineselanguage programs, and the younger "MTV generation" prefers flashy new programs. Cf 1996 IIPA
Special 301 Submission, supra note 117, at 215.
131 Liu, supra note 16.
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meantime survival-of-the-fittest competition will be intense. Taiwan
enforcement authorities and U.S. officials should expect that some operators
might believe it worth the risk to continue pirating copyrighted programs as
they pull out all the stops to stay in business.
2.

New Trade BarriersErected

At the same time Taiwan's Legislative Yuan appeased U.S. demands
to crack down on video piracy by enacting the cable law, it unexpectedly
added a provision that prohibited all direct foreign investment. 132 The U.S.
government continues negotiations on this matter, but one U.S. investor,
133
Warner Communications Inc., has found a clever way around the ban.
Film giant Warner acquired rights to run a cable company in Taiwan
in 1995 when it obtained 49 percent of shares of the Taichung-based Taihua
Co. through a local holding company, for which there are no restrictions on
foreign investment. 134 Upset that Warner had violated the intent if not the
letter of the cable law, Taiwan legislators asked the GIO to take action to
prevent Warner and other foreign companies from controlling cable
operations, but GIO Director-General Jason Hu determined that Warner had
done nothing expressly illegal, thus he would not issue sanctions.135
In response, some lawmakers now want an amendment to eliminate
the holding-company loophole. 136 However, whether the ROC government
will tighten the law to establish iron-clad protection against foreign
investment in the cable market is not a foregone conclusion. In fact, the
government, under commercial and diplomatic pressure from the United
States, might well amend the law in the opposite direction to actually permit
limited foreign investment in cable systems.
On one hand, some officials believe that limits on foreign
competition are necessary to support the fledgling Taiwanese cable
industry. 137 Despite years of illegal operations, cable technology remains in
its infancy in Taiwan, and almost all companies lack superior management,
132
133
134

Taiwan Cable Television Law,
art. 20.
Tseng, supranote 107.

Tseng, supranote 107.
Tseng, supra note 107.
136 Tseng, supra note 107. However, there are no published
reports of other foreign companies
135

takinj advantage of this loophole.
Tseng, supra note
107.
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program production and service delivery.13 8 For this reason, they argue that
these companies should be at least temporarily protected from foreign
competition.13 9
On the other hand, the pervasiveness of such industry weaknesses
support a persuasive argument for allowing investment by experienced
foreign companies to help the local enterprises more quickly and efficiently
integrate state-of-the art technology and management. Indeed, several U.S.
firms have said that unless they are allowed to take a "significant equity
stake in local entities
they will leave their experience, technology and
140
home."'
at
expertise
But economic and technological arguments for toppling this trade
barrier could carry little weight with some ROC lawmakers who continue to
harbor great resentment toward the U.S. government because of its
heavyhanded pressure to enact the cable law. These leaders simply do not
want to enhance market opportunities for U.S. investors 141--even if shutting
out foreign investment also means delaying progress toward Taiwan's goals
for communications and technology.
Perhaps a more significant provision-and one far less likely to be
amended-is the cable law's requirement that one-fifth of all programming
be domestically produced. 42 Most ROC officials believe that limits on
foreign influence are necessary to preserve and promote Taiwanese culture,
and for this reason
alone the restriction almost certainly will not be
43
compromised.1

138
139
140

Tseng, supra note 107.

Tseng, supra note 107.
Taiwan--Telecom, Cable TV Regs, 1995 NAT. TRADE DATA BANK
MKT. REP., Mar. 21, 1995
(derived from Apr. 7, 1994 report prepared at the American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei) [hereinafter Cable
TV Regs]. Foreign investment likely would benefit Taiwan's domestic technology agenda as well as U.S.
investors who are seeking a lucrative new market, discussed infra part IiI.B.2.
141 Mark,
supra note 102.
142 Taiwan
Cable Television Law, art. 36.
143 Tseng, supra note 107.
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Several commentators confidently predict that Taiwan's cable law
signals greater government openness and a trend toward political
liberalization.144 Professor Bonnie Peng, for example, notes that for the first
time in Taiwan's history the cable law encourages widespread media
participation without reserving channels for party or government
interests. 145 But such encouraging steps and Taiwan's constitutional
guarantee of free speech notwithstanding, 146 the cable law provides the
government with statutory authority to significantly censor programs and
147
advertising.
The text of the law itself clearly provides for strict, direct government
control of programming and advertising, 148 and while such power would not
necessarily be used to repress political opposition, it could be. The law
further specifies significant penalties, including license revocation,
equipment confiscation and substantial fines for operators who violate
various provisions, including content standards. 14 9 Whether the cable law
would be relied on to block political dissent should not be blithely
dismissed in a nation less than a decade removed from martial law and still
facing substantial political instability. Among other tactics, the government
could attempt to legitimize censorship by basing it in the ancient Confucian
tradition, which many Taiwanese continue to regard as a primary moral
50
authority.
'44
145

Lewis et al., supra note
8, at 185.

Peng, supra note 2, at 103.
Constitution of the Republic of China art. 11,
reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD (Gilbert H. Flanz ed., 1995). "The people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing
and publication." Id. However, article 23 allows these rights to be restricted "as may be necessary to...
maintain social order or to advance public welfare." Id. art. 23.
'47 Taiwan
Cable Television Law, arts. 35, 37, 40,41.
148 ld
'49 Taiwan
Cable Television Law, arts.
56-62.
150 See, e.g., Herbert H. P. Ma, American Influence
on the Formation of the Constitution and
ConstitutionalLaw of the Republic ofChina: Past History and FutureProspects, in CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN ASIA: ASIAN VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE 39, 46 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1988-89). A common
Asian view is that freedom of speech should be protected, but only insofar as it does not disrupt the
development of the political or economic order.
Id. at 14-15. See also TEH-HOU JEN, THE
146
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In addition to provisions that allow direct government intervention in
programming and advertising, the law's strict engineering standards and
15
high capitalization requirements also might implicitly control dissent. 1
The high cost of obtaining a license-and the high cost associated with
violating the terms of the license-might lead operators to err on the side of
politically safe blandness. At the very least, cable operators who have
invested millions of dollars to obtain licenses, meet government standards
for hardware and legally acquire programming, will be less likely to risk
their investment by transmitting programs and advertising that oppose,
threaten or otherwise displease the government.1 52 Operators might not
even be fully conscious of such choices.
While there apparently has been no overt censorship or prior restraint
of cable transmissions, the possibility of government interference is far
more likely now than when the Fourth Channels were unregistered,
unregulated and unaccountable to the government for their livelihood. To
the extent governmental police power enjoys public support because of the
Confucian moral tradition, and government censorship can thus be
legitimately rationalized, criticism is perhaps misplaced, if not altogether
moot. However, if liberal Western standards of government and free speech
have gained political validity in Taiwan, the level of government control
authorized by the cable law likely will be judged excessive by the
Taiwanese people as well as outsiders. One clear indication that the
Taiwanese endorse Western-style free speech was the enormous popularity
of the Fourth Channels. Further evidence of the public's values may be
found in the recent rise of pirate radio stations, which have gained53 a
significant following since cable operators became subject to regulation. 1
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1975, LAW AND POLITICS IN TAIWAN
9
13 9 -46 J11
78).
Taiwan Cable Television Law, arts. 21, 23,
33.
152 Scott McDonald,

Taiwan's Cable TV Industry Tries to Change Image, REUTER NEWS SERV.,

Apr. 26,1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File.
Rajiv Chandra, Renegade Radio Roils Taipei Airwaves, INTERPRESS
SERV., Dec. 15, 1994

(Many radio broadcasters, whose operating costs are far less than other electronic media, choose not to
procure licenses, "revelling in their rebel status and helping spread the message of the opposition."); see
also Jeremy Mark & Marcus Brauchli, Taiwan Faces Violence Linked to Talks with China, Closing of

PirateStation, WALL ST. J. Aug. 4, 1994, at A8 (In August 1994, a government crackdown on the popular
pirate radio stations sparked widespread rioting in support of the broadcasters. A taxi driver explained that
the public supported the illegal radio stations because "nobody censors the scripts before they go on the
air."); Annie Huang, Democracy Tops the Hit List on Taiwan's Pirate Stations, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-

May 29, 1994, at A23 (When the government levied large fines against radio stations that
broadcast unauthorized call-in talk shows, the broadcasters raised the money from listeners.).
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Yet despite its potential as a basis for censorship, the cable law also
includes a variety of safeguards against government tyranny and corruption.
Among these are the provisions for a politically diverse and objective
Review Committee, 54 for compensation to landowners whose property is
disrupted by the laying of cable, 15 for wide distribution and limited family
holdings of cable company shares, 156 and for 157administrative review of
rejected applications for cable operating licenses.
2.

A Step Toward Technology Goals

The Cable Television Law requires operators to acquire advanced
systems technologies, 15 in part because only by improving cable
technology will the nation progress toward the government's ambitious
goals of establishing a National Information Infrastructure ("NII") 159 and
developing Taiwan as a regional center for multimedia operations. 16° A
government task force is drawing up plans to provide NII access in every
154

Taiwan Cable Television Law, arts.
9, 15, 16, 17:

No more than half of the members of the Review Committee shall have the same party
affiliation. They shall not participate in the activities of political parties during their term in
office .... Members ... shall exercise their powers fairly and objectively and shall remove

themselves from the case under review in the event of [conflicts of interest] ....An applicant
for the operation of cable television may apply for the recusal of a member of the Review
Committee should he/she have reason to believe that the said member is prejudiced or
unqualified ....The chairperson shall adjudicate on the application (for recusal] ....Should a
member of the Review Committee not remove himself/herself from application review whe
he/she should do so, the [GIO] may annul the resolution(s) made at the committee meeting
concerned [on its own initiative or upon petition].
155 Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 6 ("[Tlhe site for and method of laying the cables shall be so
selected -as to cause the least damage, and compensation shall be paid .... In case of objections, an
application may be filed with the ...government for arbitration. Should the owners or occupants of the
land or structure reject the resolution of the arbitration, they may file a civil lawsuit in accordance with the
law.").
Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 20 ("A shareholder and his/her
related enterprises, spouse,
directly related blood relatives, directly related relatives by marriage, and relatives by blood within the
second
of relationship shall together hold no more than 20 percent of the shares.").
157degree
Taiwan Cable Television Law, art. 24 ("The [GIO] shall state
the reason(s) for rejecting
applications for cable television operation that have been disapproved by the Review Committee ....If an
applicant disagrees with the rejection .. .he/she may apply for a second review within thirty days of
receipt of the written notification of rejection.").
Taiwan Cable Television Law, arts. 23,
33.
159 Zarit,
supra note 78.
160 Regional Operations Centre PlanR ssupra note 11ll;
see also Zarit, supra note 78, at 17.
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161
school, office, factory and home in the country within the next decade.
Cable television is considered a key link to the NII because cable already is
available throughout
the country and is a familiar medium for most
162
Taiwanese.
But while the cable law requires operators to upgrade equipment, it
does not require improvements sufficient to support interactive
communications.16 3 Cost considerations likely will keep operators from
unilaterally initiating such improvements, 16 which are crucial for
development of the NII and multimedia industry. 16 Thus, to meet the NIl
deadline, a cable law amendment may be needed to guarantee interactive
capabilities and coordination of cable TV networks. To help defray the
substantial costs to operators, however, the government also might want to
offer an incentive (tax credits, for example) to operators who commit to a
timely, state-of-the-art system upgrade.
Yet even as the cable law's hardware standards serve as an impetus
for the industry to upgrade its technology, the law's provision against
foreign investment may delay or limit improvements to cable systems, thus
slowing progress toward the Nil. Taiwan cable TV almost certainly could
develop much faster and more efficiently in concert with foreign investors
who are experts in the field, but major U.S. companies with the know-how
and experience to help Taiwan modernize are not interested in sharing
technology on a consulting or short-term basis. 166 Representatives of U.S.
firms have said that nothing less than a twenty percent investment in
individual system operations would make participation in the Taiwan cable
market desirable to U.S. companies. 167 To the extent that Warner

161

Zarit, supranote 78, at 18.

162 An important element of the Nil is so-called distance learning,
and already cable is providing
limited educational services. Some cable stations began transmitting undergraduate and graduate courses
from accredited U.S. universities in January 1995. College By TV, CHNA ECON. NEWS SERV., Sept. 15,
1994, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library, REUTER TEXTLINE File. Mind Extension University of the
United States offers televised courses provided by 25 U.S. universities, including state universities in
California, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Washington, and the New Jersey Institute of Technology. Id The forcredit courses include: business administration, sociology, food sciences, marketing, financial mangement,
and foreign languages. Id
163
164

Zarit, supra note 78, at 18.

Zarit, supra note 78, at 18.
165
Zarit, supra note 78, at 18.
166 Cable TV Regs, supranote 140; see also Tseng, supra note 107.
167
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Communications Inc. has finessed the investment ban, this concern may be
overstated. 168 Nevertheless, a more certain answer to the problem, and one
more likely to reassure potential foreign investors, would be an amendment
to the cable law that explicitly allows limited foreign investment.I19
IV.

CONCLUSION

While the full effects of Taiwan's 1993 Cable Television Law may
not yet be apparent, the measure clearly will be far-reaching. To begin with,
holders of copyrights in the United States, Taiwan and elsewhere already
have benefited significantly from the new regulations.' 70 However, the
USTR should maintain its pressure on the ROC government to enact
retroactive IP protection
that would extend these benefits to holders of pre171
1965 copyrights.
For its part, Taiwan's government benefits from the statutory
authority to tax cable operators, and, viewed from a police-power
standpoint, it benefits from the law's grant of express power to restrict
content and thus control political dissent. 172 The ROC government also
gains a structure by which to improve Taiwan's communications
technology and achieve the goal of a NII. If it is serious about its timeline
for the NII, however, the government should consider amending the cable
law to require further technological upgrades, and should provide tax
incentives to encourage operators to quickly install improvements. 173 An
amendment that expressly allows at least some foreign investment would
further speed modernization of cable systems, and would address USTR
74
concerns about trade barriers.'
The people of Taiwan also benefit from the cable law in that
additional tax revenue and updated communications technology improve
their economic quality of life. It is less clear, however, whether they will
continue to enjoy the full variety of entertainment and political
programming to which they became accustomed with the Fourth Channels.
168
169

170
171
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That the people value free expression seems apparent from how they
robustly embraced the Fourth Channels and subsequently tuned to pirate
radio since the rise of cable regulation. If the ROC government intends to
proceed on its avowed post-martial-law path of increased freedoms, it will
expressly forbid censorship of political
expression communicated via cable
1 75
television as well as other media.
Taiwan has made great strides in recent years to address international
IP inequities, as well as to enhance its own democratic freedoms and
economic progress. The cable law, although it is but one small piece of the
nation's continuing complex political-social evolution, has demonstrated
potential to be a valuable tool in these endeavors. Taiwan's task now is to
use this tool effectively, guard against misuse, and where appropriate
sharpen it to best address new issues as they arise.

175 See supra part III..1

